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11.1. IntroductIon
During their lifetime, political parties face a range of strategic dilem-
mas. Some involve the dilemma between vote, office and policy success 
(Strøm 1990; De Winter 1998: 238-40). Some revolve around the exact 
nature of party goals, policies or coalition strategies. However, in some 
cases, parties also face some fundamental strategic and organisational 
choices about whether to become parties at all in terms of standing can-
didates at elections, establishing distinct party platforms and operating 
exclusive membership through an organisation that is independent of 
other political parties. As will be discussed below in the case of the Scot-
tish National Party (SNP), such strategic and organisational choices are 
by no means straightforward but can involve vigorous internal debate, 
divisions and splits. Such choices might also not be one-off events, but 
rather recurrent due to fluctuating levels of electoral success and occasi-
ons when alternative strategies appear attractive. Both endogenous and 
exogenous factors are responsible for such developments in the life of a 
party, as they face strategic choices and organisational challenges 
(McAllister 1981: 238). 
To make sense of such strategic and organisational choices and their 
effect on party development, this chapter applies Pedersen’s model of 
party lifespans to the SNP. It will examine the impact of passing through 
Pedersen’s different lifespan thresholds on SNP organisation (the party 
on the ground, party in central office and party in public office) and 
party goals. It will also focus on key events in relation to the SNP’s suc-
cess in passing the thresholds of representation and relevance/gover-
nance, which came in 1999 in the shape of electoral reform and the esta-
blishment of the regional level of government in Scotland.In doing so, it 
recognises that Pedersen’s model was a heuristic device (Pedersen 1982: 
3), so that there will be no exact conceptual or chronological fit between 
the model and the SNP’s political development. Indeed, the manner in 
which the SNP passes through the various thresholds is definitely not 
chronological or sequential, though it does occur at the national level of 
elections (1934-97) and only latterly at the regional level (1999-2007). In 
addition, the party’s success in surpassing the various thresholds is 
accompanied by organisational growth and a level of institutionalisa-
tion, and without electoral alliances with other political parties, even 
when it formed the government in Scotland in 2007. Furthermore, in 
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Pedersen’s human terms, the party’s birth and infancy lasted a relatively 
long time and it faced possible death in the 1950s and from 1979-84, only 
to experience a dramatic resurgence in the 1990s that led the party into 
minority government in the Scottish Executive in 2007. These latter facts 
illustrate its existence as a mature, electorally successful party within the 
autonomist party family. 
11.2. the LIfespan of the snp
 
In the absence of a regional level of government until relatively recently 
(1999), the lifespan of the SNP is characterised by several decades of 
struggling to pass the thresholds of declaration and authorisation at the 
state-level. Stable representation followed from the 1970s. However, it is 
only with the creation of the Scottish Parliament that the SNP that the 
SNP could complete the threshold cycle outlined by Pedersen (1982), beco-
ming a party of regional government in 2007 (see table 11.1). The following 
sections consider the SNP’s lifespan in more detail. 
Table 11.1. The lifespan of the SNP
 
a) Regional level
I II III IV-A IV-B V
1999 SNP
2007 SNP
b) State level
I II III IV-A IV-B V
1934 SNP
1970 SNP
1974 SNP
1979-2010 SNP
c) European level
I II III
1979-2009 SNP 1
Key: I) Threshold of declaration; II) Threshold of authorisation; III) Threshold of 
representation; IV-A) Threshold of relevance:  blackmail potential; IV-B) Threshold of 
relevance: coalition potential; V) Threshold of governance. 
Note
 1  The SNP had a nominated MEP in the European Parliament before the first direct elec-
tions in 1979.
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11.2.1. The Threshold of Declaration
Whilst the threshold of declaration sounds straightforward in theory, in the 
SNP’s case, the exact moment of threshold-crossing is difficult to discern 
both in the sense of the declaration itself but also the fact that the declara-
tion was rhetorical rather than real. For example, a range of pressure 
groups merged together to form the National Party of Scotland (NPS) in 
1928. This party was the outcome of the failed non-electoral strategy of the 
Scottish Home Rule Association in the 1920s – especially the strategy of 
holding a constitutional convention (Keating and Bleiman 1979; Mitchell 
1996). The formation of the NPS did lead to electoral contestation as it 
passed the threshold of declaration to contest 15 seats in the years 1929 to 
1933 (Lynch 2002: 37). By contrast, when the SNP was formed in 1934, it 
contested relatively few elections between then and 1964 – 43 seats 
contested in all – with only one electoral success in the special conditions 
of World War Two.1 Instead, it faced internal conflicts over electoral versus 
non-electoral strategies and over its political goals.
In the immediate period following its establishment, the SNP faced 
internal conflicts over whether it should exist as a political party or a cultu-
ral movement and then whether it should contest elections or operate as a 
cross-party pressure group. First, there were internal divisions and expulsi-
ons of some prominent SNP members from the party’s cultural wing, who 
were not committed to an electoral approach but who saw the party as a 
cultural movement (McAllister 1981: 239). Second, a more serious challenge 
to the threshold of declaration came with the secession of John MacCor-
mick and a number of SNP activists to form the cross-party Scottish Con-
vention in 1942. This secession involved the abandonment of an electoral 
strategy completely, in order to create a cross-party pressure group with 
the aim of establishing a constitutional convention to design a self-govern-
ment policy involving Scotland’s political and social elites (Mitchell 1996: 
123). MacCormick had attempted to convert the SNP to this strategy in the 
1930s. However, having failed to convert, he led a group of nationalists out 
of the SNP and into the Convention.2 The new organisation – and the sub-
sequent Scottish National Assembly and National Covenant Association – 
provided an alternative route for nationalists in this period. It made life 
both difficult and easy for the SNP. Difficult because it created a competi-
tor for activists, resources and political attention that lasted for ten years. 
1 The absence of a general election between 1935 and 1945 is part of the reason for electo-
ral contests in this early period.
2 The effect on the SNP organisation is difficult to discern. Brand (1978: 243) calculated 
that the Scottish Convention had 743 members in March 1943, most coming from the 
SNP and the Liberals. However, the SNP reported 30 active branches in 1944 and had 
appointed a full-time organiser, with membership of 1228 by May 1946 (Lynch 2002).
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Easy, because it removed opponents of the electoral strategy and of inde-
pendence from the SNP, so that it became easier for the party to surpass 
the threshold of declaration as internal opposition was now muted. Thus, 
when the SNP came to write its new constitution in 1948, it was able to 
establish a new organisational structure that enforced an exclusive mem-
bership on the SNP for the first time (McAllister 1981).3 The party was also 
now run by a younger generation of nationalists, committed to both inde-
pendence and to a long-term approach to electoral politics.
However, though the SNP reached the threshold of declaration in 1948 
in more concrete terms than it did at any time since 1934, declaration was 
just that. It did not mean that the SNP actually could contest elections. 
Indeed, the striking thing about the SNP’s electoral fortunes after 1948 was 
that they were so poor despite passing the threshold of declaration. The 
period following the threshold of declaration saw the SNP contest its fewest 
numbers of Westminster seats, a total of 26 between 1934 and 1948 but only 
13 between 1948 and 1960. The SNP was also not particularly active in local 
elections in this period either, meaning it contested very few local wards and 
gained little success – 11 contests in 1949, reaching a peak of 34 in 1957 
(mostly in Glasgow) and then only 2 contests in 1959 (Lynch 2002: 83). Thus, 
not only was the party failing to make any progress in surpassing the 
threshold of declaration in general elections, it was also failing to do so at 
local elections. Some of the endogenous reasons for this situation will be 
dealt with in relation to the threshold of authorisation in the next section. 
However, it is also necessary to consider the political climate at the time, as 
an exogenous explanation for the SNP’s performance in this period. The 
1950s in particular can be viewed as the highpoint of two-party politics, 
class-voting and economic concerns, especially as the United Kingdom 
(UK) emerged from wartime conditions and rationing. In contrast, the late 
1940s and early 1950s was a period of nationalist mobilisation in relation to 
the National Covenant and the retrieval of the Stone of Destiny from West-
minster Abbey in London by a group of student nationalists in December 
1950.4 Both of these events attracted considerable publicity and support 
within Scotland. Thus the early 1950s were not a ‘dead’ period for Scottish 
nationalism in general, only for the SNP specifically, with considerable nati-
onalist activism and prominence not feeding into electoral support for the 
SNP at local or general elections (Lynch 2002: 77-9). 
3 This change led to the resignations of Douglas Young, party chairman from 1942 to 1945 
and Roland Muirhead, who left to establish the cross-party Scottish National Congress 
in 1950.
4 The Stone of Destiny was the coronation stone of the Scottish kings, taken by Edward I 
of England in 1296 and placed in Westminster Abbey. Its removal by a group of nationa-
lists gained widespread publicity. The National Covenant was a highly popular petition 
signed by about 2 million Scots that called for a Scottish parliament.
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11.2.2. Threshold of Authorisation
As noted in the Introduction to this volume, the threshold of authorisation 
refers to the capacity of a political party to comply with the legal and pro-
cedural requirements for contesting elections. In this sense it combines exo-
genous rules and requirements set by the state and administered by local 
government with endogenous organisational capacities within political 
parties (not least in relation to financial resources). In the UK, these legal 
regulations were fairly limited until quite recently. Before 2000, electoral 
rules were determined by the various Representation of the People Acts 
passed by the UK parliament, with implementation by local authorities. 
However, since 2000, a new regime has been added to this, with the crea-
tion of the Electoral Commission through the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendums Act. This legislation gave the Electoral Commission a 
range of functions such as monitoring electoral law and elections, maintai-
ning data on party donations and spending to ensure parties remain within 
electoral law, overseeing a formal process for party registration and review-
ing parliamentary boundaries.
Before 2000, electoral rules contained details for candidate nomina-
tions, election finance and electoral deposits that had to be met if a candi-
date (and party) was to contest a particular constituency at elections. Can-
didates would require an official election agent who would be responsible 
in law for a variety of administrative and financial functions on behalf of 
the candidate (and effectively the party) – such as gathering and lodging 
nomination forms, organising printing and publishing of election mate-
rial, completing the election expenses and so forth. Thus, organisationally 
(as well as financially), political parties needed a local organisational 
structure with a modest level of competence to stand candidates at elec-
tion time.
There were several aspects to the SNP’s organisational capacity in the 
period from 1934 to the mid-1960s that limited its ability to pass the 
threshold of authorisation and onto that of representation. These were 
closely connected to the weakness of the party in central office and on 
the ground. First, there is the fact that general elections in Scotland 
involved contests in 71 constituencies, with a first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral system in single member constituencies. However, the SNP’s 
organisation fell far short of competing in all constituencies. For exam-
ple, the SNP reported having 28 branches representing 1228 members in 
May 1946 (Lynch 2002: 66-7), and 2460 members organised into 45 local 
branches and groups in May 1950 (ibid.: 73). In 1960, the party reported 
only 23 functioning local parties in Scotland and this even declined to 18 
in 1962 (ibid.: 108). After that, party membership and local organisation 
rose dramatically and the SNP was capable of emerging as a credible 
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election-fighting machine in many areas. By 1965, the party had 140 
branches, and 484 branches by 1968 (ibid.: 108); by the end of 1968 it also 
claimed to have 125,000 members. Notably, local parties were increa-
singly able to fight elections without financial or organisational assi-
stance from the central party organisation. However, this had taken 
forty years to achieve.
Second, for general elections, from 1918 onwards – meaning the whole 
life of the SNP – candidates/parties were required to lodge an electoral 
deposit to contest a seat. This deposit was £150 and it would be forfeited if 
the party gained less than 12.5% of the vote. From 1985, the deposit was 
changed to £500 and 5% of the vote (and £1000 for European Parliamen-
tary candidates).5 Providing the deposit and coming up with election cam-
paign funds was a persistent problem for the SNP, especially in the 1940s 
and 1950s. For example, the party had only £470 to fund the 1950 election 
campaign and had to subsidise local parties to fight the few seats contested 
(ibid.: 75). In 1951, the two seats contested cost £501 and £492 each, for a 
party constantly in debt and losing money, with an overdraft of £1457 in 
1952 for the national party organisation (ibid.: 92). In terms of the election 
deposit, the SNP’s share of the vote frequently fell below the 12.5% hurdle, 
meaning that every contest yielded few votes but generated costs that had 
to be met by the local party or the central organisation (see table 11.2). 
Throughout this period, the SNP was electorally and organisationally sta-
tic and arguably in danger of dying on its feet. It lacked major sponsors to 
finance its elections, such as the trade unions supporting Labour and the 
business community for the Conservatives. It also had a small membership 
and organisation to sustain campaigning. One way out of such difficulties 
involved electoral alliances. This strategy was favoured and pursued by one 
party insider in the 1930s – John MacCormick (MacCormick 1955) – but 
not by the party. When the issue was discussed in a more serious way in the 
1960s, with the proposal for the SNP and Liberals to stand down in favour 
of each other’s candidates in some seats, both leaders and activists in the 
SNP were opposed (Wolfe 1973), not least because the SNP was doing so 
well compared to the Liberals.
5 If, for example, a party were to contest all of the Westminster parliamentary seats in 
Scotland in 1983, it would cost £10,800 in deposits, with some prospect of losing this 
money if support in a constituency fell beneath the 12.5% threshold. In 1987, by contrast, 
a party needed £36,000 to contest all of the Westminster seats in Scotland, though had a 
greater likelihood of seeing this money back given the 5% threshold per constituency. 
There was no deposit system for local elections making, them, conceivably, cheap for 
small parties to contest, though the requirements for nomination, election agents and 
expenses remained in place, so some level of party organisation was required.
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Table 11.2. SNP electoral contests and lost deposits at general elections, 1935-70
Election Year Seats Contested Lost Deposits
1935 8 6
1945 8 6
1950 3 3
1951 2 1
1955 2 1
1959 5 3
1964 15 12
1966 22 10
1970 65 43
However, after 1960, the party entered a dramatic growth phase in relation to 
electoral success, organisation, membership and finance. Growth in support 
at a few by-elections in the early 1960s, central party reorganisation and the 
appointment of a full-time party organiser (self-funded) combined with more 
favourable political circumstances to help the SNP grow. Nevertheless, the 
threshold of authorisation remained a challenge (see table 11.1). For example, 
in 1964, the SNP contested its largest number of seats – 15 – but lost deposits 
in 12 of them. All seats were contested for the first time in February 1974.6 
Thus, it took 40 years for the SNP to exist as a truly national party, capable 
of contesting seats across Scotland and emerging as a genuine national force. 
Of course, whilst the SNP coped with the threshold of authorisation more 
easily as the party grew in membership and electoral support – meaning it 
could afford campaign costs and lost deposits – the situation was rather dif-
ferent when the party faced a severe downturn in its fortunes. For example, 
after the electoral disaster of 1979 – proposals for devolution were defeated in 
a referendum and the SNP lost 9 of its 11 seats in the general election held a 
few moths later – the party faced difficult times. Internal divisions led to a 
loss of electoral support and a decline in membership and money; this meant 
that lost deposits were more likely and less affordable. At the 1983 election, 
for example, support for the SNP fell to 11.8% with the loss of 54 deposits.7 
Much of the period that followed in the 1980s was taken up with recovering 
from this period of severe downturn in the party’s fortunes.
6 The SNP contested all Westminster seats from this election onwards, except in 1987 
when it did not contest Orkney and Shetland in order to give a free run to the Orkney 
and Shetland autonomy movement.
7 The change of rules concerning election deposits in 1985 had benefits for the SNP in 
1987. At that election, the party lost only one deposit (where it gained less than 5%) in the 
constituency of Roxburgh and Berwickshire. Had the old rules applied – which required 
12.5% – the party would have lost 37 deposits.
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11.2.3. Threshold of Representation
In the case of the SNP, the state level was really the only level that mattered 
in terms of securing representation, as Scotland did not feature regional-
level elections until 1999. Whilst the party’s difficulties in surpassing the 
thresholds of declaration and authorisation hold part of the key to the 
party’s inability to pass through the threshold of representation, the FPTP 
electoral system and the nature of party competition provided further major 
obstacles to electoral representation. The SNP’s first electoral success at a 
general election was in 1970, with victory in the Western Isles seat (see table 
11.3). However, the SNP had won two Westminster by-elections in quite dif-
ferent political conditions in 1945 and 1967. The 1945 victory was at a by-
election in Motherwell and Wishaw whilst the Second World War was 
ongoing. The SNP succeeded as the Conservatives did not contest the 
Labour-held seat as part of the war-time pact between the main parties not 
to fight by-elections. The party’s second by-election success in Hamilton in 
1967 came in more normal political conditions and at a time of dramatically 
increasing SNP support. Here the party won 46% of the vote and took the 
seat from Labour, which was in government. Significantly, the SNP’s victory 
allowed it to cross the threshold of relevance as the main parties began to 
address the issue of Scottish self-government. However, just as with Mother-
well and Wishaw in 1945, Hamilton was lost at the subsequent UK general 
election, so that crossing the threshold of representation was fleeting.
Table 11.3. Election results in Scotland, 1945-2010
Year Conservative Labour Liberal  
Democrats
SNP
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1945 41.1 27 49.4 40 5.0 0 1.2 0
1950 44.8 32 46.2 32 6.6 2 0.4 0
1951 48.6 35 47.9 35 2.7 1 0.3 0
1955 50.1 36 46.7 34 1.9 1 0.5 0
1959 47.2 31 46.7 38 4.1 1 0.5 0
1964 40.6 24 48.7 43 7.6 4 2.4 0
1966 37.7 20 49.9 46 6.8 5 5.0 0
1970 38.0 23 44.5 44 5.5 3 11.4 1
1974 (Feb) 32.9 21 36.6 41 8.0 3 21.9 7
1974 (Oct) 24.7 16 36.3 41 8.3 3 30.4 11
1979 31.4 22 41.5 44 9.0 3 17.3 2
1983 28.4 21 35.1 41 24.5 8 11.7 2
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Year Conservative Labour Liberal  
Democrats
SNP
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1987 24.0 10 42.4 50 19.2 9 14.0 3
1992 25.7 11 39.0 49 13.1 9 21.5 3
1997 17.5 0 45.6 56 13.0 10 22.1 6
1999 (S) 16.0 18 39.0 56 14.0 17 29.0 35
2001 16.0 1 43.0 55 16.0 10 20.0 5
2003 (S) 16.5 18 35.0 50 15.0 17 24.0 27
20051 16.0 1 29.0 40 23.0 11 18.0 6
2007 (S) 16.6 17 32.0 46 16.0 16 32.9 47
2010 16.7 1 42.0 41 18.9 11 19.9 6
Notes:
(S):  Scottish elections, only constituency vote % is reported. 
1  Number of Scottish seats at Westminster reduced from 72 to 59.
The limited ability of the SNP to break through the threshold of represen-
tation changed markedly in 1974 (see table 11.3). The SNP won 21.9% of the 
vote and 7 seats in February and then 30.4% and 11 seats in October. The 
October election was the SNP’s electoral peak in terms of share of the vote 
and placed the party second to Labour. And, whilst numerical representa-
tion at Westminster was limited by the FPTP electoral system, it did result 
in a range of policy measures to address Scottish issues including legisla-
tion to create a regional assembly in 1978 – again crossing the threshold of 
relevance. Had this regional institution been established, it would have had 
a transformational effect on the political opportunity structure of the SNP. 
However, it was not to be. The Yes vote was 51.6% but the devolution pro-
posal failed as less than 40% of the registered electorate voted Yes. Though 
the SNP declined dramatically at the 1979 and 1983 general elections, retai-
ning two seats on each occasion, the party did not disappear. Indeed, 
whilst these were the party’s worst years in recent times, a slow recovery 
was evident from the mid-1980s and especially at the 1992 and 1997 general 
elections as support for the party sat at just over 20%.
The SNP also developed a profile at the European level by winning a 
seat at the European elections in 1979 and retaining representation within 
the European Parliament continuously since then. The real effect in 1979 
was to give a boost to party morale following the devolution debacle and 
the loss of 9 Westminster seats. However, the result also gave the party a 
third full-time elected politician, as well a resources and research-support 
during a time of severe contraction. However, real advances in relation to 
the threshold of representation came in 1999 with the first elections to the 
new Scottish Parliament, which employed an Additional Member System. 
This combined FPTP and regional top-up lists (allocated on a proportional 
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basis) and provided the SNP with 35 seats out of 129, second place at the 
election and a role as the main opposition party in the parliament. This 
situation continued in 2003 in spite of a considerable loss of support and 
seats for the SNP – the first constituency vote fell to 24% and the party lost 
8 seats – before a resurgence in 2007. In the latter election, the SNP became 
the largest party in the Scottish Parliament in terms of seats (47), first 
constituency vote (32.9%) and second regional vote (31%) – the first time it 
has come first at any election in its history – and established a minority 
government in Edinburgh.
11.2.4. Threshold of Relevance
Pedersen’s notion of the threshold of relevance offers a key question for 
autonomist parties such as the SNP, namely what difference to they make to 
politics and policy in their region or in the wider state?The impact of the 
SNP has been felt through politicising the national question and mobilising 
it into Scottish and UK politics. In this way the SNP has been policy-rele-
vant. As regional government has only been in existence in Scotland since 
1999, governmental opportunities have been limited. However, the SNP has 
exhibited both blackmail and coalition potential in relation to the party 
system (Sartori 1976), with coalition potential occurring in two distinct for-
mats at Westminster and then in Edinburgh since 1999. Blackmail potential 
was evident in both the late 1960s and in the mid-1970s as the party crossed 
the threshold of representation. The SNP’s rise in by-elections in the second 
half of the 1960s – and winning Hamilton in 1967 – created a political impe-
tus for the party’s opponents to address Scottish issues. Plaid Cymru’s per-
formance in Carmarthen in 1966 (see Elias, this volume) also influenced 
both Labour and the Conservatives to address the devolution issue. Labour 
announced it was to create the Royal Commission on the Constitution to 
examine the issue of devolution in 1968 as a means to head off the rise of the 
nationalists (HMSO 1973). The Conservatives responded with their Decla-
ration of Perth, which committed the party to establish a legislative assem-
bly for Scotland. This proposal was examined by an internal constitutional 
committee from 1968 onwards, leading to the publication of Scotland’s 
Government in March 1970 (Mitchell 1991: 58). The committee proposed a 
directly-elected Scottish Convention, with powers similar to the Scottish 
committees already in existence at Westminster, but the issue was not pur-
sued with any great conviction when in government from 1970-74. 
Whilst such limited accommodations with nationalism aided the main 
parties at the 1970 election, renewed support for the SNP at by-elections 
and at the two general elections of 1974 brought clear examples of black-
mail potential and policy responses by the main parties. Of the two parties, 
Labour was the most forthcoming in relation to accommodating nationa-
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lism. Not only had the Royal Commission on the Constitution reported in 
favour of legislative devolution in 1973, but also Labour stood to lose consi-
derable seats and votes to the SNP unless it addressed the devolution issue. 
Though it was the Conservatives who lost most seats to the SNP in 1974, it 
was Labour that stood to lose support in its electoral heartlands and, along 
with it, the seats needed to form a majority in the House of Commons. 
Thus, the minority Labour government formed in February 1974 
announced its intention to bring forward proposals for devolution in the 
government’s legislative programme in March, followed by a government 
paper on alternatives for devolution in June 1974 (Lynch 2002: 129). This 
document was followed by the commitment to create a Scottish Assembly 
in the Labour manifesto for the October 1974 general election (Labour 
Party 1974). Labour’s support for devolution helped the party to retain sup-
port and seats in Scotland; electoral support was down only -0.3% compa-
red to February and the party actually gained one seat. However, the SNP 
was close behind Labour in share of the vote and in many seats, meaning 
that the devolution issue required follow-through by Labour in govern-
ment. Labour dealt with devolution as legislation in two different ways. Ini-
tially, Labour introduced a joint devolution bill for Scotland and Wales in 
1975, which was rejected and withdrawn in the House of Commons in 1976. 
Separate bills for Scottish and Welsh devolution were then created in 1977 
and the Scotland Act was passed in 1978 – albeit subject to a referendum.
Whilst the devolution referendum failed in 1979, the devolution issue did 
not disappear entirely from the political agenda. The SNP’s blackmail 
potential was tamed for a time, not least as the party descended into inter-
nal conflict over strategy and ideology. However, the devolution issue retur-
ned after the 1987 general election, with pressure on Labour to make bol-
der commitments to a Scottish assembly. Following the SNP’s by-election 
victory in Glasgow Govan in November 1988, there was renewed pressure 
on Labour to promote devolution. This led to its participation in the Scot-
tish Constitutional Convention during 1989-95, which designed a compro-
mise devolution policy amongst political parties, trade unions, local autho-
rities and a range of civic organisations. Much of the Convention’s scheme 
was instituted in the Scotland Act 1998, following the devolution referen-
dum of 1997. Thus, in 1999, the SNP’s blackmail potential manifested itself 
in the creation of a devolved Scottish Parliament. This constitutes the 
party’s most obvious institutional impact on Scottish and UK politics to 
date.
Whilst the SNP has manifested blackmail potential on several occasi-
ons since the 1960s – and seen some policy success as a consequence – coa-
lition potential has been more elusive. The SNP was able to exhibit some 
coalition potential in the 1974-9 period, when it was involved in sustaining 
Labour in government after it lost its majority. However, the real coalition 
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potential here was exhibited by the Liberals, who established a formal pact 
with Labour to sustain it in government in exchange for limited policy con-
cessions. However, this pact did not involve government office or Ministers 
for the Liberals, just an agreement that the party would provide Labour 
with a parliamentary majority when necessary. This situation was quite 
exceptional in post-war UK politics and has not been seen since. 
The creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 increased the SNP’s 
coalition potential as coalition government became the norm in the new 
regional multi-party system. However, the SNP did not enter into coalition 
discussions after either the 1999 or 2003 Scottish elections, nor was it in a 
position to do so as secure deals were made between Labour and the Libe-
ral Democrats without reference to other parties. The situation was quite 
different in 2007, however. The SNP was the leading party after the Scot-
tish election, winning marginally more votes and seats compared to 
Labour for the first time ever. This placed it in pole position to form a 
government. However, attempts at forming a coalition administration 
failed when the Liberal Democrats refused coalition talks. The outcome 
was an SNP minority government, established with the acquiescence of the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats as well as the active support of the 
Greens.The new government proceeded to deal with policy and legislation 
on an issue-by-issue basis, negotiating with opposition parties in the parlia-
ment on legislation and budgets. And, of course, this development meant 
that the SNP passed through the threshold of relevance in relation to 
blackmail potential and coalition potential, whilst also crossing the 
threshold of governance – though not in a majoritarian or coalition situa-
tion. The minority government was relatively popular in opinion polls in 
Scotland from 2007 to the autumn of 2009, by which time support for the 
SNP had eroded. Incumbency was made difficult by the economic situation 
from 2009, as well as the shift in political focus to the UK level of political 
action due to the 2010 UK general election, at which the gap between the 
SNP’s popularity at the UK and Scottish levels was even more apparent 
(the party scored 32.9% in 2007 but only 19.9% in 2010). These incumbency 
effects also had some effect on the party on the ground, with many party 
activists drawn into local government and the Scottish Parliament in 2007, 
making for a rather muted campaign at the UK election in 2010.
However, government status was a key development for the SNP, not 
merely in historic terms as its first time in government since its establish-
ment in 1934, but also in relation to its attempts to build a credible position 
as a governing party as well as to lead the constitutional debate on inde-
pendence and more powers for the Scottish Parliament. The SNP govern-
ment hosted a National Conversation on constitutional change from 2007-
2009. This involved consultation events on further devolution and 
independence across Scotland, as well as discussions with a variety of pres-
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sure groups and the publication of a wide range of government policy 
documents related to constitutional change, the economic powers available 
under devolution, media and broadcasting policy, and so forth (Harvey 
and Lynch 2010). Around the same time, the Unionist parties in the Scot-
tish Parliament and at the UK level agreed to establish the Commission on 
Scottish Devolution to examine the case for more devolved powers for 
Scotland. The Commission report in 2009 proposed a range of minor legis-
lative powers be transferred to Scotland in addition to the creation of a 
controversial new tax-sharing arrangement (Commission on Scottish Devo-
lution 2009). Implementation of these proposals was promised by the UK 
coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats after the 
2010 UK election, with a new Scotland bill to be published in autumn 2010. 
11.3. changes In party organIsatIon
Changes in the SNP’s organisation during its lifespan are summarised in 
table 11.4. For the SNP, passing the thresholds of declaration, authorisation 
and representation were rather drawn out affairs; they were in fact pro-
cesses rather than events. However, the period that preceded the party’s 
electoral growth and its arrival in electoral politics as a serious force in 
1974 involved extensive organisational growth and membership expansion 
in the 1960s; these changes were necessary precursors to the crossing of the 
threshold of representation. 
The SNP’s organisation had fluctuated at a relatively low level from 
1934 into the mid-1960s. The party had a functioning central office for 
some of this time, but very limited membership, finance and organisational 
capacity. In the 1960s, that all changed dramatically as both the party on 
the ground and the party in central office expanded rapidly. Firstly, the 
party organisation was overhauled following an internal report in 1963, 
with a restructuring of office-bearers and elected positions within the 
party. The intention was to make party structures more concerned with 
policy and strategy rather than with routine administrative matters (Lynch 
2002: 106). Secondly, a full-time national organiser was appointed (and 
self-funded) to oversee organisational growth and this individual adopted a 
hands-on approach to growing the party’s membership and building 
branches across Scotland.
However, what was key to these two organisational developments was 
the level of popularity for the SNP and for Scottish autonomy in the chan-
ged economic and political circumstances of the 1960s. For example, com-
peting organisations to the SNP in the national movement had declined 
and disappeared by the 1960s, leaving the SNP as the sole surviving organi-
sation of a national movement that had its origins in the 1920s (Brand 
1978). Moreover, the SNP focused on contesting by-elections and gained 
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new levels of support as a more attractive third party alternative to Labour 
or the Conservatives. It did so through addressing socio-economic con-
cerns at a time when the condition of the Scottish economy was an impor-
tant issue; it was especially important in Labour constituencies in a period 
of Labour government from 1964 on. Therefore internal and external deve-
lopments combined to produce a positive political opportunity structure 
for the SNP.
Organisational growth at this stage was dramatic. As noted above, the 
number of party branches grew rapidly during the 1960s (Lynch 2002: 109). 
The impact of this on party organisation was threefold. Firstly, it improved 
the party’s election-fighting capacity across Scotland, meaning that it allo-
wed the party to contest some seats for the first time, fulfilling the 
threshold of declaration in concrete terms. Secondly, the influx of members 
provided funds for fighting elections, campaigning between elections and 
also expanding the party’s central organisational capacity, in the form of 
central offices compromised of policy and communications staff rather 
than purely administrators. Resources were spent on developing and com-
municating policy (Müller-Rommel 2002), with the production and distri-
bution of party literature across Scotland; the SNP’s professionalisation 
even eclipsed the capacity of the other parties in some areas. Thirdly, these 
developments helped the party to cross the threshold of representation at 
the Hamilton by-election in 1967, local council elections in 1968 then the 
general election in 1970 when the SNP won its first seat outside of a by-elec-
tion (and continuous electoral representation at Westminster ever since). 
Though membership, local organisation and finance all dipped after the 
late 1960s growth spurt, the party was on an entirely different footing after 
this period and experienced a second growth period in the mid-1970s as the 
party won 7 then 11 seats in 1974 and the issue of Scottish devolution made 
the SNP policy relevant in the 1974-9 period.
Of course, the SNP’s electoral peak in the 1970s was not without its 
downside. Organisationally, the 1974 election victories created competing 
leaderships in the SNP at Westminster and in Scotland, with limited com-
munication between them. This meant that internal party life became 
dominated by conflicts between the party in central office and in public 
office, which spilled over to include the party on the ground after 1979. 
These debates involved the relationship between the party and the Labour 
government, attitudes to devolution and in time, the ideological positioning 
of the SNP. On the one hand, a group of Members of Parliament (MPs) in 
London was dealing with life at Westminster for the first time, sustaining 
or opposing a weak Labour government to help bring about legislation to 
create a Scottish assembly. The voting behaviour of the group on legisla-
tion at Westminster was under the spotlight, with divisions within the 
group about devolution and whether to support Labour policy in other are-
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as.8 On the other hand, there were the party’s elected office-bearers and 
National Executive members in Scotland, the central organisation. These 
had to deal with issues in Scotland, had limited contact with the parlia-
mentary group and sought to see the party advance against Labour by 
adopting centre-left positions that the MPs might have opposed in votes at 
Westminster.
When the SNP faced this situation again after 1999 – when it again had 
a substantial body of elected members – the difficulties of a dual leadership 
were avoided as most of the existing party office-bearers and National Exe-
cutive members became Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). 
Moreover, having the parliament in Edinburgh made contact with the rest 
of the party much easier as did the need to keep party activists onside to 
gain prominent positions on the regional electoral lists. The overlap of the 
party in central and public office was successful in avoiding conflict, until 
after the 2003 Scottish election, when a downturn in electoral support for 
the SNP undermined the party leader, John Swinney, leading to the return 
of former leader, Alex Salmond. Though Swinney resigned as leader in 
2004, he was instrumental in making organisational changes to the SNP. 
Swinney orchestrated reforms in internal party democracy that replaced 
delegate-voting with the one-member-one-vote procedure to select party 
leaders and parliamentary candidates. Before the 2003 Scottish election, 
several prominent SNP MSPs had been effectively deselected by the actions 
of local parties with small numbers of members, giving them a disproporti-
onate impact on selecting MSPs. The ‘one-member-one-vote’ policy was 
seen to remove this problem. Swinney also altered the SNP’s rules to make 
it more difficult to challenge the party leader, in order to prevent the desta-
bilisation of the leadership. When Swinney was challenged as SNP leader 
in 2003, the challenge came from an ordinary party member (not an MSP) 
who only needed the nomination of one local party organisation to stand. 
From 2004, any candidate for the SNP leadership or deputy leadership 
would require the support of 100 members from at least 20 local branches 
to be nominated. 
In addition, whilst the SNP’s organisational expansion preceded electo-
ral representation in the 1960s and 1970s, the party’s electoral decline (along 
with the fall in importance of the devolution issue in 1979) saw organisatio-
nal losses and something of a battle for survival for the SNP as the party 
declined at all levels. The party’s central office shrank to the bare bones – 
losing communications and policy staff – and saw its branch organisation 
collapse from around 500 in 1980 to a much more concrete 281 branches by 
8 The minutes of meetings of the parliamentary group at Westminster were kept private to 
avoid leaks to the media, as many votes were 6 to 5, which would have demonstrated how 
divided the MPs were.
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1988.9 Membership also dropped, from 28,558 in 1980 to 12,060 in 1985, and 
fundraising was a problem until the 1990s, with the party losing most of its 
staff and had few funds for organisational modernisation or campaigning. 
Election of an MEP in 1979, rising to 2 MEPs in 1994, did provide some 
research and office resources related to the European Parliament, though 
insufficient to compensate for the loss of MPs and central office capacity. By 
the late 1990s, the SNP had recovered from the post-1979 crisis, with increa-
sed levels of electoral support, more stable membership, increased finances 
and also a rebuilt central office – comprised of research and communica-
tions staff rather than simply administrators. Moreover, much of this orga-
nisational capacity was maintained from 1999 to 2007, with more focus on 
campaign activity through the SNP’s call centre, and enhanced policy capa-
city through the creation of a central research unit of 7 staff in the Scottish 
Parliament as well as MSPs’ researchers.
Whilst the 1990s saw gradual organisational and electoral improve-
ments for the SNP, it was the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
1999 that transformed the SNP’s political status, electoral fortunes, finan-
cial resources and organisational capacity. In this sense, access to this new 
institutional level had a radical effect on the party unlike anything seen at 
the state-wide and European levels. Three things are worth pointing out 
about the post-1999 development of the SNP. 
Firstly, the party’s electoral success produced the highest number of 
full-time elected members, provided them with prominent positions in the 
parliament and media, and also generated parliamentary resources for 
local offices and research and administrative staff. The party had 6 MPs 
and 2 MEPs before devolution; after devolution it also had 35 MSPs and a 
lot more staff.10 The SNP suddenly looked bigger and more of a force 
across Scotland. This phenomenon was even more pronounced after the 
2007 election, when the SNP won FPTP seats in some areas for the first 
time and had a total of 47 MSPs elected to the Scottish Parliament.
Secondly, the party’s electoral strength coupled with changes to arrange-
ments for state funding for parties ensured a significant growth in resources 
for the SNP as a result of devolution. Under existing funding rules, the SNP 
received public funds to support its MPs at Westminster (known as Short 
money). This scheme became operational in the Scottish Parliament after 
1999 and was accompanied by new money to support policy development. 
These changes transformed the resource base of a party that had previously 
relied on individual donations and found itself unable to compete with 
9 105 of these branches had less than 30 members and 15 were single constituency branches 
(Lynch 2002: 163).
10 There was 336 full and part-time MSP staff on the Scottish Parliament’s payroll on 31 
March 2000 (Scottish Parliament 2000). How many worked for the SNP was difficult to 
determine, though the party had 35 of the 129 MSPs.
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Labour and the Conservatives in general election campaigning as a result. 
For example, from March 2001 to March 2007, the combined income from 
public funds totalled £1,688,961.49 (total registered donations to the SNP 
were £3,152,255.58 in this period). Public funding plus increased individual 
donations helped the SNP to outspend Labour at the 2007 Scottish election 
by £1,383,462 to £1,102,866. The improvement in finances was especially 
important because SNP membership actually declined in this period to 
8,209 (at the time of the 2004 leadership election), before recovering to 
13,236 in 2007 after a central membership scheme was instituted. In January 
2010, the SNP announced its membership had risen to 15,644.
Thirdly, as discussed briefly above, the post-devolution period saw two 
shifts in power within the SNP. Leadership and policy influence passed to 
the MSPs after 1999, though these were tightly integrated in the pre-1999 
leadership and National Executive. Then in 2007, such powers passed to the 
party in public office much more directly as the SNP formed a minority 
government in the Scottish Executive. Because of the overlap and integra-
tion of the MSPs within existing party structures, there was little conflict 
compared to the 1970s,11 and government office has not really altered this 
situation. Despite problems in governing, there has been little internal con-
flict within the SNP, perhaps aided by a minority government that has not 
involved fundamental policy trade-offs with coalition partners. This situa-
tion contrasted very dramatically with the period of internal conflict that 
ripped through the party after the failed devolution referendum and the 
1979 UK election. In any case, the party in central office is now less impor-
tant than it was before 1999. The shift of power from the party on the 
ground and in central office was well-managed by the party’s political elites.
Table 11.4. Pressure for organisational change upon crossing thresholds
Threshold Regional level State level European level
V
-
Medium
Shift of power to the 
party in government 
IV-B
IV-A
III
-
-
Strong
New staff and 
resources
Shift of power to the 
party in public office
-
-
Medium
Increase of staff and 
resources
Conflict between 
central office and 
public office
-
Medium
Increase of staff and 
resources
11 Despite the relative peace within the party at large, 3 different MSPs left the party or 
were expelled due to indiscipline and sat in the Parliament as independents.
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Threshold Regional level State level European level
II
-
Medium
Candidate selection 
and policy-making 
procedures
-
Strong
Creation of local and 
central organisation 
and resources
I
-
Strong
Creation of local and 
central organisation 
and resources
Key: I) Threshold of declaration; II) Threshold of authorisation; III) Threshold of 
representation; IV-A) Threshold of relevance:  blackmail potential; IV-B) Threshold of 
relevance: coalition potential; V) Threshold of governance. 
11.4. changes In party goaLs
Party goal change within the SNP has been limited in recent years. Debate 
over party goals was most pronounced in the period from the 1930s to 1940s, 
when there was strategic differences within the SNP over contesting elections 
versus focusing on cross-party initiatives. Both goals and strategy became cle-
arer after the split in the party in 1942, when a group of activists left to form 
the Scottish Convention (see above). After this departure, the SNP became 
more party-oriented in terms of trying to focus on elections to combine a 
vote-seeking and policy-seeking approach, with the goal being independence 
for Scotland. This situation lasted until the 1970s, when the SNP was caught 
up in debates on devolution and, most notably, in supporting devolution (not 
independence) in the House of Commons from 1974-78 and at the devolution 
referendum of 1979. This development did not involve goal change as such – 
as the SNP still supported independence – but caused strategic disputes 
within the party over how to respond to intermediate institutional reforms 
short of independence. The problem here was the party losing support and 
internal coherence from becoming involved in another party’s constitutional 
goals, as opposed to independence. These disputes were deep and damaging, 
especially after the 1979 referendum debacle. After this, the SNP entered a 
period of internal fighting over attitudes to devolution versus independence; 
gradualists who supported devolution as a first step to independence were 
opposed by fundamentalists who adopted an ‘independence nothing less’ atti-
tude. In the short-term, the fundamentalists were victorious after 1979, before 
the gradualists reasserted themselves. This division was accompanied by ide-
ological factionalism over the extent of the SNP’s centre-left identity from 
1979-84, which was linked to but not synonymous with the gradualist-funda-
mentalist divide in the party. However, the effect was that the party’s internal 
life and external political status became contaminated by conflict over goals 
and ideologies. As a consequence, the party lost both members and voters.
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The votes versus policy dilemma is a useful means of understanding 
the SNP’s problems during these years. The party had gained electoral 
support as a result of popular support for Scottish autonomy in the broad 
sense, rather than independence. In that sense votes translated into 
policy, but not influence over the exact contents of policy (a not dissimilar 
situation occurred from 2007-10). After the 1974 elections, SNP MPs at 
Westminster, and the party at large, found itself caught up in debates 
about the details of Labour’s devolution legislation in 1976 and 1978 as 
well as tangled up in the referendum campaign in 1978-9.The party was 
unable to play a decisive role in shaping devolution policy from 1974-9. 
Moreover, it was left with the choice of supporting a Labour minority 
government in delivering a flawed devolution policy or, alternatively, 
defeating the government and losing the prospect of a Scottish assembly 
altogether.However, after 4 years of debate on devolution and a govern-
ment troubled by economic and political crises, the momentum behind 
constitutional change had receded by 1979, though there was an expecta-
tion that devolution would actually be delivered at the referendum. The 
SNP’s subsequent losses at the 1979 general election cannot be under-
stood in relation to the trade-off between policy and votes as the context 
of the 1979 general election was so different from 1974. The devolution 
agenda had run its course by 1979, with voters using the SNP as a vehicle 
for constitutional change in 1974 then switching back to their partisan 
preferences on other issues in 1979, especially government performance 
and the state of the economy.
History did not repeat itself in subsequent years. The SNP altered its 
independence policy in the late 1980s in favour of an explicit policy of inde-
pendence within the European Union. The goal of independence was thus 
Europeanised at a time of important advances in supranational integration 
(Lynch 1996). This policy change was popular and was part of the reason 
for increased SNP support in the late 1980s. The party also resisted beco-
ming involved with its opponents in designing a common policy for devolu-
tion in the shape of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (1989-1995). 
Staying away from the Convention cost the SNP popularity in the short-
term, but it meant that its independence in Europe policy remained pure, 
thus avoiding the post-1979 difficulty of being co-opted into supporting 
devolution rather than independence. The party retained this position until 
after the publication of the Labour government’s white paper on a Scottish 
parliament in July 1997. This meant the SNP could campaign for inde-
pendence in Europe at the 1992 and 1997 general elections, and maximise 
the pressure on Labour over devolution and its delivery after 1997. The 
SNP did come to support devolution at the 1997 referendum, and participa-
ted in cross-party campaigning in support of the Yes vote. Crucially, in 
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contrast to 1979, the referendum was a success, with the Scottish Parlia-
ment established in 1999.
Institutional change in the shape of the Scottish Parliament radically alte-
red the political opportunity structure for the SNP. Devolution meant that 
Scotland had a regional level of government for the first time and a context in 
which the SNP was set to do well. Not only did devolution allow the SNP the 
best forum in which to campaign on Scottish issues and the constitution, but 
the electoral system for the parliament (using a combination of FPTP and 
PR) was also likely to deliver many more seats for the SNP compared to the 
FPTP system used in general elections. This development affected the SNP 
in two ways in relation to party goals. First, the parliament provided an insti-
tutional mechanism with which to hold an independence referendum – a 
democratic mandate and trigger for independence. SNP policy goals were 
therefore strategically softened to promise an independence referendum rat-
her than immediate independence. This was an attempt to appeal to soft 
nationalist voters concerned about the rush to independence, allowing voters 
to support the SNP as the main opposition party knowing that they would 
have a future opportunity to decide on Scotland’s constitutional future. 
Second, this approach dovetailed with the SNP’s attempts to cast itself as a 
party of government. The party adopted a range of policies and personnel 
with the explicit goal of entering the Scottish Executive.
These new goals required the SNP to mature as a party, be less opposi-
tional and more focused on policy and institutions rather than the constitu-
tional issue alone. This focus on office success did not work in 1999 or most 
obviously in 2003, but succeeded in 2007 when the SNP overtook Labour 
as the leading party for the first time ever. This reality increased the pri-
macy of the regional level of government over the UK-level and notably, the 
SNP did not see any electoral benefits from regional office at the UK elec-
tion in 2010. In addition, the SNP contributed to advancing the issue of 
regional autonomy whilst in government but failed to hold an inde-
pendence referendum due to lack of support in the Scottish Parliament. 
There was also no evidence of increased support for independence amongst 
Scottish voters during the SNP’s time in regional office. The party did not 
change its fundamental goal of independence, instead it used regional 
office to attempt to steer the debate on greater autonomy for the devolved 
institutions and took a consensual approach to change through its three-
year National Conversation consultation.
11.5. the poLIcy Impact of the snp
In terms of policy impact, there are three interconnected areas that merit 
consideration. Firstly, there is the general issue of territorial/constitutional 
politics that the SNP elevated onto the political agenda. Whilst there was a 
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national movement in Scotland before the 1960s, the constitutional issue 
was rarely prominent and issues such as the economy and employment, 
were seldom viewed through a distinctive Scottish lens. However, this 
began to change from the 1960s onwards. Constitutional politics came to 
the fore – though fluctuating in intensity and importance – whilst Scottish 
issues or a Scottish variant of UK issues came to be addressed by the other 
political parties. Indeed, the other political parties began to stress their 
Scottish identity in this period, producing distinctive Scottish manifestos 
(Labour only did this for the first time in October 1974), changing party 
names, symbols and organisations to reflect the Scottish dimension. Thus 
the SNP helped to bring about changes in the nature of party competition 
as well as the party system itself.
Secondly, although the SNP sought to get the issue of independence 
onto the political agenda, its real success was getting devolution onto the 
agenda, as the other parties responded to the SNP’s electoral success by 
formulating their own policy on Scottish self-government. In the case of 
Labour, this meant legislating for devolution in government in 1978 and 
1998, with the Scottish Parliament established in 1999. Thus the SNP’s suc-
cess saw two waves of institutional development in favour of Scottish auto-
nomy. Since then, the SNP helped to advance the debate for greater policy 
autonomy for the devolved parliament. The SNP proposed fiscal autonomy 
from 2002, whilst the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats also moved to 
support greater powers for the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Liberal Demo-
crats 2006). After the 2007 Scottish election, all of the main parties propo-
sed institutional change to the Scottish government and parliament, with 
the SNP holding its National Conversation during 2007-9 and the Conser-
vatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats publishing the results of their 
Commission on Scottish Devolution in 2009.
Third, there is the impact of the SNP in government in Scotland for the 
first time since May 2007.Most importantly for the party is the constitutio-
nal issue, with the SNP looking to advance independence through using the 
government machine to produce a draft white paper on independence and 
an independence referendum. The party also sought to cooperate with 
other political parties to gain more policy powers for the parliament. Some 
progress on the independence would thus seem to be essential during the 
SNP’s period in government; if office success means no policy success in 
this key area, then activist and voter dissatisfaction would be the likely 
result, even if soft nationalist voters like some of the SNP’s policy success 
in other areas of government. The SNP’s performance here was mixed, 
with no referendum being held during the 2007-2011 legislature. 
The SNP has also tried to advance Scottish interests and make Scotland 
appear more state-like. There was intergovernmental cooperation with 
other devolved institutions in the UK, such as collaboration with Northern 
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Ireland in pursuit of taxation powers, and Wales in an effort to seek more 
legislative powers. The SNP also sought more Scottish input into EU policy 
and tried to develop more formal mechanisms for interacting with the UK 
government. This was the first time in which the SNP governed Scotland 
and it spanned two different UK governments. Relations between the SNP 
government and UK government under Labour were relatively poor at the 
public level but more positive in the early period of the UK Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010. 
Third, there is the ‘good government’ dimension, meaning producing a 
situation in which the SNP is seen as a success in office in domestic policy 
areas such as education, policing, environment and health, in addition to 
the economy (Scottish Government 2007, SNP 2007).12 Improving 
Scotland’s economic performance was not just an important aspect of the 
SNP’s plan for government, but also intrinsic to promoting independence 
itself: with Scotland strong enough economically to succeed as an indepen-
dent state. However, some of the policy performance began to be under-
mined with the onset of economic recession, as proposals that required 
public investment (such as increased police numbers, a local council tax 
freeze, free prescription charges, free personal care for the elderly and so 
forth) came under financial pressure. The SNP government had to alter its 
expansive approach to public services and the economy from 2007 to a 
more defensive strategy to manage recession in 2008-9 (Scottish Govern-
ment 2009). However, one significant area of success for the SNP govern-
ment was in the area of renewable energy. Not only did the government 
assist in levering investment into this area to expand renewable energy in 
Scotland, but it also arguably came to control part of a policy area – 
energy – even though it was reserved to the UK government under the 
Scotland Act 1998.
11.6. concLusIon
This chapter has examined the SNP’s lifespan since its formation, focusing 
on key internal and external events and developments that have assisted – 
and at times prevented – passage through different thresholds towards elec-
toral success and relevance as a political party. Passing through the diffe-
rent thresholds has also been connected to organisational changes and 
changes in party goals. Key to such developments have been the relatively 
late transformation of the SNP’s political opportunity structure in the 
shape of the creation of a Scottish level of government in 1999, using an 
electoral system that facilitated effective vote-gathering. At the same time, 
12 The Scottish Executive established a Council of Economic Advisors in June 2007 to 
advise on economic policy, chaired by the former head of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
George Mathewson. This initiative became controversial due to the cost of the 
organisation.
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this institutional change boosted the party’s coalition potential and its pro-
spects of obtaining government office. This was achieved for the first time 
in 2007:a grand total of seventy-three years after the party was founded in 
1934 (a long time to wait for office success compared to many other autono-
mist parties). However, the effect of government office on party organisa-
tion and goals remains to be seen.
There are a number of specific concluding points to be made about the 
SNP’s development and its ability to cross Pedersen’s thresholds within the 
lifecycle of political parties. First, whilst the threshold of declaration 
appeared as the most simple of thresholds to cross, the level of strategic 
contestation within the Scottish national movement made this threshold 
highly problematic for the SNP. For example, the threshold of declaration 
was highly contested in the national movement and then within the SNP 
after 1934. The SNP only passed the threshold in 1948. Even then, it did not 
become a reality until the 1960s and the SNP fought all Scottish seats for 
the first time in February 1974. Thus it effectively took 40 years for the 
threshold of declaration to become organisationally complete. Second, the 
threshold of authorisation was legally straightforward with few legal obsta-
cles to the SNP in participating in elections. However, organisational 
obstacles stood in the SNP’s way here – meaning lack of members, limited 
local party organisation, financial costs of election campaigning and the 
need to fund an election deposit for each party candidate. These internal 
factors were responsible for the SNP’s weak capacity to contest elections 
and also for the fact that its ability to cross the threshold of declaration was 
solely rhetorical and acted as a blockage to surpassing the thresholds of 
representation and relevance.
In relation to the threshold of representation, the electoral system as 
well as party organisation and finance placed limits on the SNP’s develop-
ment and performance. Representation was achieved sporadically at by-
elections in 1945 and 1967, before the party was able to secure electoral 
representation at a general election in 1970. Since then, the SNP has had 
continuous state-level representation, peaking in 1974. Moreover, the 
party’s best performances saw it cross the threshold of relevance in relation 
to blackmail potential in the late 1960s and mid-1970s. Devolution itself in 
1999 was also an example of the SNP’s blackmail potential being fulfilled. 
Moreover, the new institution increased the SNP’s relevance as the electo-
ral system for the Scottish Parliament made single party majoritarian 
government highly unlikely; coalition or minority government became the 
norm, as the SNP discovered in 2007. In this context, the SNP succeeded in 
becoming a party of government at the regional level. However, crossing 
this threshold had limited effects on the SNP. It brought about little inter-
nal organisational change or tensions and had modest effects on policy 
change and performance. Support for the party has fluctuated in govern-
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ment although has remained relatively strong. Office allowed the party to 
help build support for greater autonomy but not independence. Public sup-
port for independence has remained low and no independence referendum 
has been held. In this respect, the SNP has to date been unable to use 
government office to deliver on its key territorial goal. 
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